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Abstract: 
Although set-up costs are prevalent and substantial in natural resource extraction, it is known that a Walrasian 
competitive equilibrium cannot exist in simple extraction models with set-up costs. This paper demonstrates 
that this result is sensitive to the assumption of unlimited extraction capacity and derives sufficient conditions 
for existence. An equilibrium exists if extraction is limited such that each firm earns sufficient surplus to cover 
its set-up costs or if firms choose extraction capacity subject to non-increasing returns. The resulting 
competitive equilibrium price either grows at the rate of interest when total extraction is below industry capacity 
or is constant when industry capacity is fully utilized. In the equilibrium, identical deposits are opened 
simultaneously, and set-up costs for new deposits are incurred when the industry has excess capacity rather than 
when capacity is fully utilized. 
Keywords: Natural resource extraction; Exhaustible resources; Extraction constraints; Set-up costs; 
Competitive equilibrium; Non-convexity; Capacity installation 
 
Article: 
1. Introduction 
Set-up costs of natural resource extraction include costs of tunneling, drilling wells, building pipelines, 
searching for deposits, and removing overburden from strip mines.
1
 These ―lumpy‖ costs must be incurred 
before any production can take place and thus induce non-convexities in the production possibilities set. 
2
 With 
non-convexities, the well-known theorems on the existence of Walrasian competitive equilibria first developed 
by Arrow and Debreu [1] are no longer applicable. Although competitive equilibria may exist in some non-
convex economies, 
3
 Hartwick et al. [16] and Fischer [14] have shown that a competitive equilibrium cannot 
exist if extraction requires set-up costs. 
4
 Without existence of a competitive equilibrium, analysis of 
competitive natural resource markets with significant set-up costs is greatly hindered.
5 
 
The difficulties of analyzing set-up costs have led to rule-of-thumb analysis or to neglect of set-up costs. 
6
 The 
well-known tools of competitive equilibrium analysis would be helpful if they could be applied. For example, 
the efficiency properties make competitive equilibria useful for project analysis and for testing the efficiency of 
markets. Competitive equilibrium price paths are useful for comparative static analysis and for analysis of taxes 
and subsidies. Finally, empirical tests of the competitive theory of exhaustible resources have largely neglected 
set-up costs. 
7
 Extending the tools of competitive equilibrium analysis to these questions could allow tractable 
analysis of natural resource extraction with significant set-up costs. 
 
This paper derives sufficient conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium in natural resource 
extraction with set-up costs. The literature demonstrating non-existence has modeled set-up costs as exogenous 
and unrelated to extraction capacity. This paper demonstrates that if set-up costs arise from the installation of 
extraction capacity, then—despite non-convex production sets—the existence of a competitive equilibrium can 
be saved by recognizing that extraction capacity may be limited. In particular, a competitive equilibrium can 
exist if current extraction is sufficiently limited or if firms choose their extraction capacity. 
 
Section 2 describes the problem of non-existence with set-up costs and argues that the results may not 
generalize when extraction capacity is limited. Section 3 then demonstrates sufficient conditions for existence 
of a competitive equilibrium when set-up costs are costs of installing capacity. The result is shown by defining a 
price and allocation path and then by proving that they form a competitive equilibrium. Section 4 characterizes 
the price path for heterogenous deposits and discusses other extensions of the results. Section 5 concludes by 
discussing several applications of competitive equilibrium analysis in exhaustible resources. 
 
2. Non-existence and extraction capacity 
In the literature on non-existence, Hartwick et al. and Fischer argue that extraction from identical deposits with 
set-up costs and constant marginal extraction costs should be strictly sequential.
8
 However, strictly sequential 
extraction requires each firm to install extraction capacity large enough to satisfy demand. If capacity 
installation is costly, simultaneous extraction from multiple deposits with set-up costs may well be efficient. 
Since the arguments demonstrating non-existence by Hartwick et al. and Fischer rely on the efficiency of 
strictly sequential extraction, their results do not demonstrate non-existence when extraction capacity is limited. 
 
There is, however, a more fundamental difficulty for existence which does not depend on the strict sequencing 
of extraction, namely: a price-taking firm has an incentive to delay incurring its set-up costs beyond the efficient 
date. To illustrate, consider a market with a single, price-taking firm owning one deposit which requires set-up 
costs and has constant marginal extraction costs.
9
 If exploiting the deposit is efficient, the set-up costs should be 
incurred immediately. Once the set-up costs are sunk, consumption in each period should be exactly as if there 
were no set-up costs, i.e., the marginal benefit should grow at the rate of interest as discovered by Hotelling 
[20]. The First Welfare Theorem then implies that a competitive equilibrium price path—if one exists—must 
yield this efficient allocation.
10
 The consumer’s optimization implies that the Hotelling price path is the only 
potential competitive equilibrium price path. Are the Hotelling price path and efficient extraction consistent 
with a profit maximizing firm? Recall that under the Hotelling rule, the firm earns equal present value profit on 
extraction in any two periods. If the set-up costs were delayed and extraction increased in later periods, the 
present value of extraction profit would be unchanged and the set-up costs would be delayed. Since this 
deviation would yield higher total profit, the firm was not maximizing profit in the proposed equilibrium. 
Therefore the proposed price path is not an equilibrium price, and a competitive equilibrium does not exist.
11 
 
Analysis of multiple deposits with set-up costs introduces an additional difficulty for existence: discontinuities 
in the efficient marginal benefit path. Hartwick et al. showed that the marginal benefit path should jump down 
each time a new deposit is opened and then should grow at the rate of interest. 
12
 Facing a price path identical to 
the efficient marginal benefit path, price-taking firms now have an incentive to deviate from the efficient 
extraction program by extracting too early at the higher price. This deviation can be profitable if the set-up cost 
is incurred an instant too early and a large amount is extracted at the higher price. Note that each of these 
profitable deviations may not be feasible if extraction capacity is limited. This paper derives conditions under 
which extraction capacity is sufficiently limited that there are no profitable deviations from efficiency, and a 
competitive equilibrium exists. 
 
3. Model of extraction capacity and set-up costs 
Consider extraction of an exhaustible resource from heterogeneous deposits. Assume there are two types of 
deposits called shallow and deep deposits. The deep deposits require set-up costs before any of the deposit can 
be extracted, but stock from the shallow deposits can simply be extracted.
13
 To emphasize analysis of the set-up 
costs, let there be only one shallow deposit with initial stock S0 and N deep deposits with initial stocks S1 = S2 = 
...
 = SN  S. Let qi(t) be extraction at time t from deposit i. The shallow deposit can be extracted at constant 
marginal cost c0.
14
 Stock can only be extracted from the deep deposits after extraction capacity has been 
installed. Let F( i) be the cost of installing  i units of extraction capacity in deep deposit i.
15
 Assume extraction 
is at constant marginal cost c after the capacity is installed and is subject to qi(t) ≤  i. Finally, let consumption 
be Q(t) in period t, and consumer surplus in each period be U(Q), where U' > 0 and U'' < 0.
16,17
 Consumers and 
producers discount at the common rate, r. 
 
To proceed further, the set-up costs and extraction technology must be described. Two types of technology are 
analyzed below: fixed and endogenous capacity. For the fixed capacity technology, the cost of installing 
capacity is given by F(0) = 0, F( ) =    for 0 <   ≤   and F( ) = ∞ for   >  . Clearly with the fixed technology, 
it will be efficient either to install capacity   at cost    or to install no capacity. 18 For the endogenous capacity 
technology, the set-up costs are given by the function F, where F is differentiable, F(0) = 0, F'>0, and F''>0. The 
endogenous technology allows firms to choose their capacity subject to decreasing returns. 
 
3. 1. The fixed capacity technology 
To demonstrate existence of a competitive equilibrium, arbitrary time paths of prices, consumption, and 
extraction can be defined. If these paths characterize a competitive equilibrium, then a competitive equilibrium 
exists. Define the price, production, and consumption paths as the optimizers of the following constrained 
optimization problem:
19
 
 
where Q(t) = q0(t) + q(T), F =   ,   =
  , and the price path is defined by p(t)   U'(Q(t)). 
 
To provide intuition for this optimization, note that it looks very much like a planner’s problem with two 
deposits. The objective function is the present value of consumer surplus less extraction and set-up costs. The 
first constraint ensures that extraction from the shallow deposit does not exceed its initial stock. The second 
constraint ensures that the total extracted from all the deep deposits does not exceed the initial stock of the deep 
deposits. The remaining two constraints ensure that extraction from the deep deposits does not occur before the 
set-up costs are incurred and thereafter does not exceed capacity. Note, however, that the optimization is not the 
social planner’s problem since it does not allow the flexibility of installing different capacity in each deep 
deposit at different times. 
 
The Kuhn–Tucker first order and complementary slackness conditions for q0 and q are 
 
where λ0 if the Lagrange multiplier for the first stock constraint, λ is the multiplier for the second stock 
constraint, and μ(t) is the multiplier for the extraction constraint. Define the augmented marginal cost as the 
marginal extraction cost plus the scarcity cost of the stock, i.e., AMC0(t)   c0 + λ0e
rt 
and AMC(t)   c + λert.20 
The first equation implies that extraction from the shallow deposit is optimal if p(t) = AMC0(t) when extraction 
is positive. The second equation implies that, after capacity has been installed, extraction from the deep deposits 
is optimal if extraction is positive when p(t) ≥ AMC(t) and at capacity when p(t) > AMC(t). 
 
To compute the optimal time to install the capacities, first note that the optimal extraction paths need not be 
continuous at T: Let q0
-
   limt Tq0(t), q0
+
   limt Tq0(t), and q+   limt Tq(t) be extraction immediately before 
and after T: Similarly, let Q
+
   limt TQ(t) be consumption immediately after T: Differentiation of the 
Lagrangian yields the first-order condition for T: 
 
Define augmented net surplus as gross consumer surplus less augmented marginal costs, i.e., ANS(t) = U(Q) - 
AMC0q0 – AMCq.
21
 Eq. (4) states that augmented net surplus after T must exceed the augmented net surplus 
before T by the interest payment on the set-up cost, 
22
 i.e., ANS
-
 + rNF = ANS
+
. This condition implies that 
there must be a discontinuous increase in augmented surplus when the capacities are installed. The following 
lemma derives conditions under which p(t) is continuous. If p(t) is continuous, consumer surplus is continuous 
and the jump occurs solely in augmented producer surplus. 
 
 
Proof. See Appendix A.  
Lemma 1 defines a trigger price, p(T); at which all capacities should be installed if p(t) is continuous. 
23
 This 
trigger price is illustrated in Fig. 1 where the set-up cost is small such that p(T) = c + λe
rT
 + rF/  < U’ (N ). The 
augmented net surplus before T; ANS-; is the area above the augmented marginal cost curve and below the 
demand curve, i.e., Area(A + B + C). Since AMC0(T) > AMC(T); production from the constrained deposits 
generates additional surplus. At T; this additional surplus is Area(D) = rNF: Thus the additional surplus, ANS
+
 
— ANS
-
, accrues entirely to the producers. 
 
 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Lemma 2 translates the condition in Lemma 1 into two sufficient conditions on exogenous parameters. Note 
that the trigger price in Lemma 1 is increasing in average cost but decreasing in deposit size. The first condition 
in Lemma 2 ensures average cost is less than the price when all firms extract at capacity. The second condition 
ensures that the stock is large enough that the capital costs are recovered before the stock is exhausted.
24
 
 
The price and extraction paths which will be a competitive equilibrium can now be described. Under the 
sufficient conditions in Lemma 2, the continuous p(t) can be written 
 
 
where
   ; and    are defined by the continuity of p(t).
25
 Let D(p) be the inverse marginal utility schedule, i.e., the 
demand curve. Optimal extraction from the shallow deposit is 
 
The price path is illustrated in Fig. 2 and the extraction paths are illustrated in Fig. 3. Note that the price and 
extraction paths resemble Hotelling’s competitive equilibrium. On [0;
   ]; extraction from the shallow deposits is 
positive while their net price grows at r. The shallow deposit is exhausted at    after which its net price grows 
more slowly. Also, the deep deposits are extracted while their net price grows at r. The following proposition 
demonstrates that the price and extraction paths shown in Eqs. (6), (7) and (8) do indeed characterize a 
competitive equilibrium. 
 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The competitive equilibrium in Proposition 1 resembles equilibria in other exhaustible resource models. The 
price is either constant or grows at the rate of interest net of extraction costs. Simultaneous extraction occurs 
from multiple deposits only if the deposits have the same costs or if some deposits extract at capacity. However, 
in contrast to the models of Hartwick et al. and Fischer, all set-up costs for identical deposits are incurred 
simultaneously, not sequentially. The following application of the First Welfare Theorem demonstrates that this 
simultaneous installation of capacities is efficient. 
 
Proof. The conditions in Proposition 1 imply existence of an equilibrium with simultaneous capacity 
installation. The equilibrium is efficient by the First Welfare Theorem.  
 
If the sufficient conditions in Proposition 1 do not hold, simultaneous capacity installation may not be efficient. 
In this case, the efficient marginal benefit path may follow a sawtooth pattern as in Hartwick et al. and a 
competitive equilibrium may not exist. 
 
3.2. The endogenous capacity technology 
For the endogenous capacity technology, the set-up costs are assumed to be a differentiable function of capacity 
with F(0) = 0, F'> 0; and F'' > 0; i.e., subject to decreasing returns. To show existence of a competitive 
equilibrium, a price path and allocation are defined from the following constrained optimization: 
 
subject to the constraints in Eq. (2). As above, the optimization in Eq. (9) is similar to a social planner’s 
problem except the optimization does not allow different capacities to be installed in the deep deposits at 
different times. 
 
Defining p(t) as above, the Kuhn–Tucker conditions are as in Eq. (3) and the condition for optimal capacity 
installation is ANS
—
 + rNF( *) = ANS+. Additionally, the Kuhn–Tucker condition for optimal capacity is 
 
where  * is the optimal capacity installed. Eq. (10) implies that the marginal cost of installing capacity should 
equal the discounted sum of the shadow values of the extraction constraint over all periods in which it binds. 
26 
 
As above, the following lemmas are used to describe p(t): 
 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
If positive capacities are installed, Lemmas 3 and 1 imply that the marginal benefit path is continuous. Lemma 
4 shows that if the choke price is higher than the extraction cost plus the interest payment on installation of a 
marginal unit of capacity, then it is efficient to install positive capacity. The proposition on existence can now 
be shown: 
 
Proposition 2. A competitive equilibrium exists for the endogenous capacity technology.  
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Proposition 2 shows that a competitive equilibrium exists for the endogenous capacity technology. The 
equilibrium is described by Eqs. (6), (7), (8), and (10). In the equilibrium all capacities are installed 
simultaneously while the price is rising and aggregate extraction is less than industry capacity. Firms choose 
extraction capacities which are small enough that there is a period of simultaneous extraction with the 
unconstrained deposit. By choosing small capacity, a firm can decrease its capacity installation cost. However, 
with a small flow capacity, it takes longer to extract the stock. The equilibrium capacity choice balances these 
costs and benefits and thus ensures that profits are non-negative. 
 
Corollary 2. With the endogenous capacity technology, it is efficient to incur set-up costs in identical deposits 
simultaneously. 
 
Proof. The first welfare theorem. 
 
4. Extensions and generalizations 
The existence results can be generalized to analyze set-up costs in resources with various sizes and costs by 
noting that the shallow deposit can model all deposits for which set-up costs have already been sunk. An 
equilibrium with many deposits has the following properties: (a) the price is alternately flat or grows at the rate 
of interest, (b) the price is flat when industry capacity is fully utilized, (c) the price rises when the industry has 
excess capacity, (d) the marginal producer, for whom net price equals scarcity cost, has excess capacity, (e) set-
up costs are incurred when the price reaches the trigger price for that deposit, (f) each trigger price is increasing 
in average cost but decreasing in deposit size, (g) additional capacity is installed when industry capacity is not 
fully utilized, (h) set-up costs are incurred simultaneously for identical deposits, and (i) extraction from a 
deposit is only below capacity when the price—net of extraction costs for that deposit— grows at the rate of 
interest. 
 
If current extraction is exogenously constrained, the sufficient conditions in Proposition 1 can be generalized to 
a variety of cost structures. 
27
 For example, the results may still obtain even if marginal extraction costs are 
decreasing in current extraction or if set-up costs are unrelated to the costs of capacity installation. An 
exogenous extraction constraint can ensure that firms earn sufficient surplus even under these cost structures. 
 
The case of increasing marginal extraction costs deserves special comment. Note that the fixed capacity 
technology with constant marginal costs approximates a marginal cost curve which is relatively flat for small 
quantities but then is very steep at larger quantities. The sufficient conditions in Proposition 1, which ensure 
that producers earn sufficient surplus to cover their capital costs, could be extended since firms earn surplus on 
their inframarginal extraction when marginal cost is upward sloping. 
 
Proposition 2 demonstrates existence when set-up costs are a function of capacity and firms choose capacity. If 
set-up costs are a function of recoverable stock (e.g., when set-up costs are costs of exploration) the 
endogeneity of the set-up costs may not ensure existence. In this case, the firm equates the marginal cost of 
expanding the stock with the shadow value of the deposit. This ensures scarcity rents can cover the set-up costs, 
but does not avoid the problems for existence discussed in Section 2. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The sufficient conditions for existence of competitive equilibrium allow the tools of competitive equilibrium 
analysis to be applied to problems in natural resource extraction with significant set-up costs. For example, first, 
the competitive equilibrium prices and allocations can be compared to observed market outcomes to estimate 
inefficiencies from market failures. 
28
 Second, the equilibrium trigger price for efficient capacity installation can 
be used in project evaluation. Third, the effects of taxes and subsidies on natural resource extraction in 
competitive markets can be analyzed .29 The equilibrium characterized above shows that subsidizing (taxing) 
set-up costs would induce a competitive firm to install excessive (insufficient) capacity at too low (high) a 
price. Fourth, competitive equilibria can be useful for comparative static analysis. Schennach [29] observed that 
extra bankable pollution permits during a transition period can be modeled as an exhaustible resource and 
derived comparative statics results on fuel switching. Competitive equilibrium analysis would have allowed 
simple, general derivations of many of the comparative statics and enabled analysis of the installation of 
pollution control technologies. 
30 Fifth, the competitive equilibria can be regulatory equilibria. A regulator with 
sufficient information could impose the equilibrium price path as a price ceiling. This ceiling would then induce 
firms to install the efficient amount of capacity at the proper time and to extract efficiently. 
 
Finally, empirical tests of the competitive theory of exhaustible resources have largely neglected set-up costs.31 
Krautkraemer [22] describes in situ tests and Hotelling valuation tests of natural resource theory. In situ tests 
rely on the assumption that the in situ value (shadow value) of a resource is the difference between the price and 
its marginal extraction cost. 32 The competitive equilibrium characterized above illustrates that, with set-up 
costs, the difference between price and marginal extraction cost may include the shadow value of capacity as 
well as the in situ value of the resource. 
33
 Similarly, Hotelling valuation tests rely on the principle that the 
market value of the firm should equal the product of the firm’s current net price and its reserves. 34 With set-up 
costs, the equilibrium value of the firm is given in Eq. (A.3). Clearly the Hotelling valuation principle would 
need to be modified for industries with significant set-up costs. 
 
Although set-up costs are prevalent and substantial in natural resource extraction, the previous literature has 
shown that their inclusion in the analysis implies that a competitive equilibrium cannot exist. However, non-
existence is sensitive to the assumption of unlimited extraction capacity. When models correctly account for 
limited extraction capacity, the sufficient conditions imply existence of a competitive equilibrium. The 
sufficient conditions can facilitate use of the tools of competitive equilibrium analysis in analyzing natural 
resource markets with set-up costs. 
 
Notes: 
1Set-up costs are significant empirically. In Cicchetti’s [8] study of the Trans-Alaska oil pipeline, the initial 
capital cost was $2 billion while annual operating costs were only $95 million. Similarly, in Holland and 
Moore’s (forthcoming) study of imported water use in Arizona, the set-up cost for building dams, aqueducts, 
and pumping stations was $2.9 billion while the total annual operating costs were only $54 million. 
2 This paper analyzes sunk set-up costs. See Farzin [12] and Lozada [23] for analysis of reversible capital 
investment. 
3 Farrell [10] first showed that a competitive equilibrium can exist in a non-convex economy with many agents, 
since the non-convexities yield only small discontinuities in aggregate demand or supply. Starr [30] later 
provided a rigorous treatment of this result. Aumann [2] showed the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a 
non-convex economy with a continuum of agents. 
4 In a related literature, Eswaran et al. [9] showed that a competitive equilibrium does not exist if there are fixed 
costs of extraction which can be avoided by extracting nothing in a given period. See also [13,21,24,26]. 
5 In an industry with significant set-up costs, non-cooperative analysis may sometimes be appropriate. See 
Hogan and Holland [18] on the difficulties of identifying subgame perfect equilibria in natural resource 
extraction. 
6 Cicchetti simply assumes the set-up costs of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline are spread evenly across the entire 
deposit. Influential studies of natural resource extraction by Nordhaus [27] and Chakravorty et al. [5] do not 
explicitly model set-up costs. 
7 See Krautkraemer [22] or Chermak and Patrick [7] for a review of the literature on empirical tests of 
exhaustible resource theory. 
8 Strictly sequential extraction is efficient since any extraction plan with simultaneous extraction from two 
deposits is dominated by a plan which delays the set-up cost of one of the deposits and reallocates extraction 
between the two deposits such that consumption is unchanged. This reallocation dominates the initial plan since 
extraction costs and consumption are unchanged but the set-up cost is delayed. With non-constant marginal 
extraction costs, the proposed reallocation would change the present value of extraction costs and thus would 
not necessarily dominate the plan with simultaneous extraction. Non-constant marginal extraction costs will be 
discussed in Section 4. 
9 Clearly, a single, unregulated firm would be expected to exert market power and would not be a price taker. 
Although this example is intended purely for illustrative purposes, the fact that each firm has an incentive to 
delay set-up costs also is true for multiple firms and has the same consequences for existence of a competitive 
equilibrium. 
10 Recall that both welfare theorems require price-taking behavior and complete markets, and the Second 
Welfare Theorem additionally requires convexity. Thus in the models under consideration here, the First 
Theorem holds, but the Second Theorem is not applicable. 
11 In a static natural monopoly, a competitive equilibrium price cannot exist since firms have negative profit 
under marginal-cost pricing. In natural resource extraction, firms earn scarcity rents, and thus may earn positive 
profits from efficient pricing if set-up costs are small. However, the preceding argument implies that a 
competitive equilibrium does not exist, even if firms could earn positive profits by pricing competitively. 
12 The Hartwick et al. result is that a set-up cost should be incurred when it generates a sufficient increase in 
surplus to cover the interest payment on the set-up cost. Since producers never receive any surplus in the 
constant marginal cost model, it is consumer surplus which must increase discontinuously, and thus the 
marginal benefit path jumps down. 
13 The shallow deposits model deposits—possibly owned by many owners—which do not require set-up costs. 
Since set-up costs are sunk costs, the extensions of the basic model in Section 4 interpret the shallow deposits as 
deposits for which set-up costs have already been incurred. 
14 The results can be extended to cost structures where extraction costs depend on current and/or cumulative 
extraction. See Section 4 for a discussion of extending the model to non-constant marginal extraction costs. See 
[19] for a similar model where extraction costs depend on cumulative extraction. 
15 Since set-up costs are only incurred once, the production set is non-convex, and the usual existence theorems 
are not applicable. Models of capacity installation by Switzer and Salant [31 ], Olsen [28] and Lozada [23] 
allow for capacity to be expanded at any time and have convex production sets. 
16 If the choke price, U'(0), is finite, then efficiency requires that the deposit be exhausted when the price 
reaches the choke price. If the choke price is infinite, then exhaustion need not occur in finite time. 
17 Consumer surplus is assumed constant over time. The results may not generalize to extreme demand shifts 
over time since it may not be possible to find a trigger price which signals efficient investment. 
18 The fixed capacity technology describes a scenario where other factors have constrained the firm’s range of 
capacity choices. Such constraints might be, for example, engineering, environmental or political. 
19 Since the optimization is of a continuous function over a compact domain, a maximum exists. 
20 Note that price equal to augmented marginal cost is the well-known Hotelling rule that net price grows at the 
rate of interest. 
21 ―Augmented‖ net surplus is smaller than the usual surplus measure since the costs are augmented by the 
scarcity cost. Note that ANS measures the flow of surplus and thus the set-up costs are not included in the 
definition of surplus. 
22This condition on augmented surplus is identical to the Hartwick et al. condition on the Hamiltonian, namely: 
H
-
 + rNF = H
+
. 
23 The static (λ = 0) intuition for the condition c + λe
rT
 + rF/  ≤ U’(N ) is that the average cost be less than the 
marginal benefit when production is at capacity. Note that this is precisely the condition which ensures 
existence of a competitive equilibrium in a static model with fixed costs. 
24 To understand the intuition behind these two sufficient conditions, consider the case where the first condition 
holds with equality, i.e., c + rF/  = U’(N ). In this case, the maximum producer surplus that a competitive firm 
can earn while producing at capacity is rF. If the firm is to earn sufficient producer surplus to cover the entire 
set-up cost, the firm would need to produce forever. Thus the ―minimum‖ deposit size would need to be infinite, 
i.e., a backstop. 
25 The endogenous shadow values are fully specified by the equations insuring continuity at
    and   ; the first 
order condition in Eq. (A.1), and the stock constraints: ∫0
∞
 q0(t) dt = S0 and ∫0
∞
 q(t) dt = NS. 
26 In peak-load pricing problems, a similar condition holds which requires that the capacity cost be spread 
across all the peak periods in which the capacity binds. Campbell [4] gives a similar result in an exhaustible 
resource model. 
27 Chermak and Patrick [6] argues that periodic extraction from gas wells is constrained by past extraction. 
Farrow [11] also mentions discussions of ―rated capacity‖ in the mining engineering literature. 
28 Borenstein et al. [3] use competitive equilibrium benchmarking to evaluate market power in the deregulated 
California electricity markets. 
29 The models of Hartwick et al. and Fischer make no predictions about firm behavior and thus cannot be used 
as a basis for such analysis. 
30
Typical SO2 pollution control technologies have significant set-up costs on the order of 20 times annual 
operating costs, US Environmental Protection Agency [32] but have limited capacities. 
31 Empirical tests have struggled with non-convexities from declining average costs (see [6]) but have not dealt 
with non-convexities arising from set-up costs. 
32 See, for example, [7,11,15]. 
33 Farrow [11] extended his analysis by correcting the in situ value when extraction was at full capacity. 
However, modeling the capacity constraint explicitly did not allow him to avoid rejecting the Hotelling theory 
for his data, i.e., his estimate of the discount rate was still negative. 
34 See Miller and Upton [25] for a seminal Hotelling valuation test. Krautkraemer describes several extensions 
to the Hotelling valuation principle. 
35 The Herfindahl result implies that for two deposits with different marginal costs, c1 and c2, and shadow 
values, λ1 and λ2, the price path is continuous and is given by p(t) = min{c1 + λ1e
rt
; c2 + λ2e
rt
}. 
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